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THE SERVICE PROVISION CHANGE REGIME
UNDER TUPE 2006
The definition of a transfer of an undertaking under
Article 1 of the Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
the safeguarding of an employees’ rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, business or parts of undertakings
of businesses (the “Acquired Rights” Directive) is whether
there is “a transfer of an economic entity which retains its
identity, meaning an organised grouping of resources which
has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether
or not that activity is central or ancillary”. The Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employees) Regulations 1981
were interpreted in the light of this definition, supplemented
by the seminal European Court guidance in Spijkers v
Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir CV [1986] ECR 1119. The
subsequent cases of Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung
GmbH Krankenhausservice [1997] IRLR 225 illustrates the
uncertainty of the law in the context of the service provision
change. Ayse Süzen is authority for the fact that the Directive
does not apply to a situation where a person has a trusted
provision of services to a first undertaking and terminates
that contract and enters into a new contract with a second
undertaking unless there is a concomitant transfer from one
undertaking to another of significant tangible or intangible
assets or the taking over by the new employer of a major part
of the work force in terms of numbers and skills assigned by
the predecessor to the contract.
In labour intensive industries such as cleaning,
maintenance and security there is rarely a transfer of assets
between transferor and transferee. In such sectors the test
is reduced to the question of whether a major part of the
workforce is taken on by the putative transferee. In
practice, therefore, this meant that the putative transferee
had the ability to govern whether there would be a transfer
by refusing to take on the employees. The test was also
circular. Whether employees had the right to transfer
depended on whether they did transfer.
When enacting the TUPE Regulations 2006 the
traditional test of a business transfer laid down by Article 1
of the Directive was, via regulation 3(1)(a), retained for
transfers of undertakings not involving a service provision
change. But a wider definition in regulation 3(1)(b) was
created for cases of service provision change. Under
regulation 3(1)(b) as long as service activities cease by one
person (transferor) and are taken up by a new person
(transferee) and prior to the change over there was an
organised group of employees, the principal purpose of
which was to carry out those activities on behalf of the
client there will be a transfer. This, overrules Ayse Süzen in
the UK since the thrust of Ayse Süzen was that a mere
change over of contractor did not trigger the Directive.
Ayse Süzen is still the operative case in European law on
service provision change and it is still applies in EU
Member States apart from the UK. The UK has taken
advantage of the liberty in Article 8 of the Directive to
make provisions more favourable to employees than are
contained in the Directive. Extending TUPE to a wider
range of situations in service provision change cases is
obviously a measure which is to the benefit as opposed to
the detriment of employees, the substructure of which
rights are contained in the Directive itself.
This provision is intended to be independent of the
traditional business transfer test (now, as stated, contained
in Regulation 3(1)(a) of TUPE 2006) and case law on its
interpretation has been eagerly anticipated. This paper
seeks to analyse such case law and examine the scope and
boundaries of the new provision.
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THE EMERGING CASE LAW
The first case on the provision was that of an
employment tribunal sitting in Reading. But it is
instructive. It is a case where, if Ayse Süzen were operative,
there would have been no transfer of an undertaking.
Under regulation 3(1)(b) there was. In Hunt v Storm
Communications Limited, Wild Card Public Relations Limited and
Brown Brothers Wines (Europe) Limited (Case No
2702546/2006, March 27, 2007), Storm Commu-
nications was a public relations services provider. Brown
Brothers Wines (BBW) was its client. In June 2006 BBW
gave Storm notice that it was re-tendering for the provision
of public relations services. Storm lost the pitch and the
work went, on re-tender, to Wild Card. The claimant had
an employment contract with Storm, as an account
manager. The job description made no specific reference
to any particular client. But she started working on the
BBW account from the outset of her employment and
continued to do so without interruption until she ceased
working for Storm. The claimant’s evidence was that she
spent some 70 per cent of her time each year on the BBW
account. The claimant’s evidence was accepted by the
employment tribunal.
It is material in this case that no assets transferred from
the first service provider to the new service provider. Nor
was the new service provider willing to take on Mrs Hunt.
Clearly, as stated, if Ayse Süzen were operative there would
be no transfer. The employment tribunal however had no
difficulty in finding there was a service provision change
pursuant to regulation 3(1)(b). As this was not a contract
wholly or mainly on the supply of goods or a contract
concerning activities to be carried out in collection with a
big event or task of short term duration (the exceptions to
reg 3(1)(b)) the sole remaining question was whether,
prior to the service provision change, there was an
organised grouping of employees, the principal purpose of
which was to provide the services to the client for the
purposes of regulation 3(1)(a). Regulation 2(1) also
provides that an organised grouping of employees can
include a single employee. This, taken with the percentage
of time spent on the client’s account made Mrs Hunt an
organised grouping of employee(s) and therefore the
conditions in regulation 3(1)(b) were satisfied.
FRACTIONAL TRANSFERS
So far so good. But some factual scenarios previously
unexplored have arisen subsequently testing robustness of
regulation 3(1)(b). These problem cases mainly concern
fractional transfers where, upon a re-tender, the service is
dispersed, not to one single service provider but to a
number of service providers. In Kimberley Group Housing
Limited v Hamberley [2008] IRLR 682, the EAT considered
there could be a relevant transfer upon such a re-tender.
The question of whether an employee transfers to a
particular transferee is a question of fact. This may be
illustrated thus. In this case, the transferor provided
accommodation and related services for asylum seekers
pending determination of their applications for asylum.
There were 140 properties in the Middlesbrough and 50
properties in Stockton to accommodate a fluctuating
number of asylum seekers. In 2006 the incumbent
contractors, Leema, lost the contract and Kimberley and
another contractor were awarded the right to succeed
Leema as a new contractor. It was held that transfers may
take place to more than one transferee even if there was
only one transferor. It might be the case that there are
some circumstances in which a service is being provided by
one contractor to a client that, in the event, is so
fragmented that nothing which can be properly
determined as being a service provision change has taken
place – but this was not the case here.
Nonetheless, the EAT decided that, there could not be a
partial transfer of an employee (a view redolent of the
decision in Hassard v McGrath (NICA) [1996] NICA 586, a
case decided under TUPE Regulations 1981). Either the
employee was transferred with the part of the function
changing hands or he or she was not. This was a question
of fact, taking into account where the substantial majority
of the employee’s time was spent or required to be spent.
In the present case, when 29 per cent of the activities were
performed in Middlesbrough by Leema and 71 per cent by
Kimberley, the EAT considered that liabilities in relation to
the employees concerned should transfer to Kimberley. As
to Stockton, where Kimberley took over 97 per cent of the
activities formerly carried out by the transferor there was
no contest. There was a regulation 3(1)(b) transfer to
Kimberley exclusively.
DIFFUSE SERVICE PROVIDERS
The question has arisen, however, whether regulation
3(1)(b) can apply on service provision changes where there
are diffuse successor providers. An example in point is the
employment tribunal case of Thomas – James v Cornwall County
Council (Case No 1701021-22) where it was held that it was
not possible to apply regulation 3(1)(b) where it was, on the
facts, impossible to identify a new service provider following
the service provision change. This was a case where
Cornwall County Council contracted with 17 service
providers to provide a free legal helpline service. Under the
scheme, callers would be routed to any available adviser
from the service providers concerned. On the contract
revision, the service providers were reduced to nine, but it
was impossible to determine that there was an organised
grouping of employees of servicing a particular client.
Regulation 3(1)(b) did not therefore apply. Also to be noted
in this context is Clearsprings Management Limited v Ankers
EAT/0054/L8. This case involved the National Asylum
Seekers Service (NASS) the function of which was to
provide accommodation for asylum seekers. Contracts were
awarded to contractors to provide this service. In the North
West there were four such service providers, including
Clearsprings. On the expiry of the contract the service was10
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re-let. Three contractors, but not Clearsprings, were
appointed. The asylum seekers looked after by Clearsprings
were randomly allocated to the incoming contractors. As in
Thomas-James no particular transferee could be identified as
having taken over the activities; it was so fragmented that
regulation 3(1)(b) could not be engaged.
Metropolitan Resources Limited v Churchill Dulwich
Currently, the leading case on the construction of
Regulation 3 (1) (b) and its relationship with legacy case law
under TUPE 1981 is Metropolitan Resources Limited v Churchill
Dulwich [2009] IRLR 700. In this case, Migrant Helpline, an
agency of the Home Office, had a contract with Churchill
Dulwich (CD) under which CD provided accommodation
to asylum seekers. Upon the expiry of that contract Migrant
Helpline entered into a new contract with Metropolitan
Resources Limited (MRL) for provision of the service at a
different location. There were also minor changes in the
manner in which the service provision was to be carried out
including (not only, as stated, a change of location) a change
in length of stay, and with a faster turnaround for residents
which required some adjustment to staff duties. Finally, not
all residents made the move to location on the same date.
The employment tribunal held that regulation 3(1)(b) of the
Regulations applied; there was a service provision change
under that paragraph in that a relevant transfer had
occurred. MRL, the putative transferee, appealed that
decision, arguing that the employment tribunal had failed to
take into account the guidelines of the EAT in Cheesman v
Brewer Contracts [2001] IRLR 144 (a case on TUPE 1981)
which required a multi-factorial approach to the question of
whether there was a stable economic entity prior to the
transfer and whether there was a transfer of an economic entity
retaining its identity in the hands of the transferee. It was
argued that this approach was still valid as far as regulation
3(1)(b) was concerned.
The EAT (His Honour Judge Burke QC, sitting alone)
held that this argument should fail. The history of the
TUPE Regulations 2006 was that when a new service
provision change regime was intended to remove – or at
least mitigate – the uncertainties or difficulties involved in
establishing a traditional transfer under TUPE 1981 (or,
now, regulation 3(1)(a) of TUPE 2006). “Service provision
change” is a wholly new statutory concept. It is, as stated,
independent of European law as the Acquired Rights
Directive does not make a similar provision. The EAT
robustly took the view that case law on TUPE 1981 (and
what is now reg 3(1)(a)) is only applicable in cases other
than service provision changes and, it followed, the
guidance of Cheesman did not apply to the question of
whether there was a service provision change. Thus:
• In considering whether there was a service provision
change, the employment tribunal had to consider
whether the service provided after the change was
fundamentally, or essentially, the same as that provided
before the change.
• The answer to that question is a matter of fact.
• The fact that the transfer did not take place wholly on
one day, that the employees did not leave the
transferor on the date of the transfer and the
providers use different locations, were not,
individually or collectively, fatal to the existence of the
service provision change.
• It cannot have been intended by the draftsman of the
new service provision rules that the concept should
not apply because of some minor differences between
the nature of the tasks carried on after the service
provision change, compared with before.
• As to the issue of the time of the transfer, bearing in
mind not all users of the service transferred on the
same date, the EAT noted that Reg 3 (6) (b) provides
that a TUPE transfer can be effected by a series of
transactions. It held that that paragraph applies
equally to Regulation 3 (1) (a) and to Regulation 3 (1)
(b) cases.
However regulation 3(1)(b) does not apply for any
activities following the change-over are “wholly different”.
Notwithstanding the broad approach taken to “activities”
in Metropolitan Resources Limited v Churchill Dulwich (see
above) in which it was stated that those activities after the
change-over compared with before cannot be identical, as
long as they were fundamentally, or essentially the same as
those carried out by the putative transfer, OCS Group v Jones
[2009] ALL ER (D) 138(Sep) EAT provides an example
where regulation 3(1)(b) does not apply because the
activities were “wholly different”.
In this case, OCS had a contract to provide catering
services to the BMW car plant at Cowley. This was to apply
for a centrally located restaurant/deli/bar supported by
what are described in the decision as four “satellites and a
general shop”. The service specification provided for
English and continental breakfasts, beverages, lunch
involving hot soup and hot meals, vegetables as well as a
salad bar, hot and cold baguettes, sandwiches, rolls, pizza,
jacket potatoes together with hot and cold deserts and
normal beverages. The two claimants in this case were
respectively a chef and a supervisor working in the
satellites.
On a re-tender MIS took over the contract from OCS on
August 1, 2007. The employment tribunal found however
as a matter of fact, that the MIS contract was a substantially
reduced service which was “materially different to that
operated by [OCS]”. There were now five “dry goods
kiosks” – there was no requirement for hot food
preparation at the satellites. The satellites were selling pre-
prepared sandwiches and salads (although some of the staff
duties remained in that the staff were to continue to ensure
the cleanliness of tables, the presence of clean trays,
condiments and the rotation of sandwiches). The
employees argued that there had been a relevant transfer
although they had a right to transfer to MIS from OCS.
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The employment tribunal held, as stated, the MIS contract
was “materially different” and “wholly different” from the
OCS contract. It was switched from a full time canteen
service to a dry goods and previous catering staff who were
chefs and the like were, in effect, becoming sales assistants
working in a kiosk.
Another case where arguments under regulation 3(1)(b)
failed is Ward Hadaway Solicitors v (1) Love (2) Scott (3)
Capstick Solicitors LLP EAT/0471/09. In this case, Ward
Hadaway carried out legal work, externally, for the Nursing
& Midwifery Council (NMC) as a panel solicitor. Upon a
re-tender, Capstick’s were appointed the sole external legal
services provider. As part of the re-structuring of the
provision of legal services, a fair amount of work was also
taken in-house by NMC, Ward Hadaway were not required
to transfer over any work in progress to Capsticks and the
firm continued to work on the files it had already been
given. Employment tribunal felt that there had been an
organised grouping of employees which had, as its
principal purpose, been carrying out the activities on
behalf of the client. But it found that it was not the case
that activities ceased to be carried out by a contractor on a
client’s behalf and carried out instead by another person (a
subsequent person) on a clients behalf as is required by
regulation 3(1)(b)(ii). Ward Hadaway continued to work
on its files; there were no activities which have ceased to be
carried out by Ward Hadaway. There were some 100 – 140
such files providing work for Ward Hadaway for at least six
months. Therefore there was no service provision change.
The EAT (Judge McMullen QC presiding) agreed and
dismissed Ward Hadaway’s appeal and, there being no
TUPE transfer, any termination claim by employees not
taken on by Capsticks lay with Ward Hadaway.
CONCLUSION
Upon the enactment of regulation 3(1)(b) of TUPE
2006 it is widely expected that litigation over service
provision changes would virtually cease, so wide is its
apparent compass. New factual scenarios, including radical
reconstruction of service provision contracts and fractional
transfers to multiple service providers have indicated
however the area will continue to be a fertile ground for
litigation.
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